fs/incfs/verity.c::incfs_read_signature() declares its working pointer to the verity-signature heap buffer as `static`. The qualifier puts the pointer in a single BSS slot shared across every invocation from every thread or process on the system. Two racing ioctl calls produce a KASAN double-free in kmalloc-256, a cross-process information leak, a KASLR-relevant kernel pointer disclosure, and — on a kernel with CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED + RANDOM + KASLR all on — SLUB freelist corruption with attacker-controlled bytes. Reported to Google ASR, closed Won't Fix (Infeasible) five weeks later. This post walks the bug from first principles — what IncFS is, what fs-verity does, why the `static` keyword turns a function-local pointer into a global weapon, what each runtime primitive actually buys an attacker, how Google's vulnerability reward program triages, and what the "Infeasible" verdict really communicates.