SixSixSix

BYOVD LSASS Dump in 2026 — PDFWKRNL, PPL Toggle, and a Cloned Target

LSASS dumping from a vanilla admin shell stopped being a one-liner the day PPL went mainstream. The modern shape is BYOVD — bring a signed driver with an arbitrary-kernel-memmove primitive, flip the Protection byte on yourself, clone the target, and dump the clone. This post walks through a from-scratch implementation against PDFWKRNL.sys (AMD USB-C Power Delivery driver, IOCTL 0x80002014), the HVCI block-list math that picks the right sample, and the full chain — driver load → EPROCESS walk → PPL flip → NtCreateProcessEx clone → in-memory MiniDump → XOR-obfuscated write. Validated on Win11 26200.

One byte of URL-encoding past a WAF: notes on CVE-2026-40050 and the GraphQL endpoint nobody fenced

CVE-2026-40050 is a routing-tree exposure on LogScale lightweight-ingest nodes. The advisory lists 1.224.0–1.234.0 as vulnerable and the SaaS fleet as "patched" because a perimeter WAF rule was deployed in April. The rule is one URL-encoded byte wide. The same hosts also expose a GraphQL endpoint that the rule never covered, which resolves `meta` and `installedLicense` pre-auth. The vendor declined the report. This is the walkthrough of the bug, the bypass, the JAR diff that shows the code fix lives in 1.235.x and not in 1.234.x, and the lesson about treating "WAF deployed" as a synonym for "fixed".

Found the same Linux iSCSI CHAP base64 overflow 25 days early — and what 'review-ready' really means

In May I found a pre-auth heap overflow in the Linux LIO iSCSI target's CHAP BASE64 decoder. I built the patch, took a KASAN trace, wrote the review document — and then sat on it for two weeks. While the patch was in "operator review", another researcher (ahossu) found the same bug independently, sent upstream, and got the fix merged. This is the walkthrough of the bug, the math, the patch I almost shipped, and the lesson I actually learned about review cadence.

ProviderSidestep — Defeating Cortex XDR's `sharphound` Rule From User-Mode, Honestly

Cortex XDR's `sharphound` behavioral rule (c0400067) consumes events from the Microsoft-Windows-LDAP-Client ETW provider. Replacing wldap32.dll with a pure-managed BER LDAP stack (Novell.Directory.Ldap on System.Net.Sockets) silences that provider. Two days of testing — including an initial false positive caused by a disconnected VPN — confirmed the transport hypothesis but uncovered a second, independent detection channel keyed on filter shape. Implementation, what we got wrong, what we got right, and the path forward.